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QUI TAM CLAIMS – A WAY TO PIERCE THE FEDERAL POLICY ON ARBITRATION?: A
COMMENT ON SAKKAB V. LUXOTTICA RETAIL NORTH AMERICA INC.
By
Lauren Picciallo*
I.  

INTRODUCTION

In Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail North America, Inc.,1 the Ninth Circuit held that the
Federal Arbitration Act § 22 (hereinafter FAA) does not preempt representative Private
Attorneys General Act3 (hereinafter PAGA) claims. Therefore, PAGA claims could not
be barred by class action waivers, despite the Supreme Court holding in AT&T Mobility
v. Concepcion.4 In concluding that the FAA did not preempt PAGA, the Ninth Circuit
held that PAGA was a generally applicable statute. A generally applicable statute is a
statute which applies to the contract in its entirety and not solely the arbitration clause.
Further, the Ninth Circuit found that the PAGA claims did not conflict with any of the
fundamental principles of the FAA, including enforcing the intent of the parties and the
efficiency of arbitration. Lastly, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that PAGA, although
containing similarities to class action arbitration, was critically different from class
arbitration in that the suit was in essence a qui tam suit brought on the behalf state.
II.  

BACKGROUND

Shukri Sakkab, Plaintiff, was an employee of Lenscrafters, formerly known as
Luxxotica Retail North America, Inc. (hereinafter Luxottica).5 On January 17, 2012,
Sakkab filed a putative class action suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California alleging “(1) unlawful business practices, (2) failure to pay
overtime compensation, (3) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements, and (4)
failure to pay wages when due.”6 The basis of the allegations arose from Luxxotica’s
classification of Sakkab and others as supervisors to exempt them from overtime wages
and time for meal and rest breaks.7
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On March 27, 2012, Sakkab added a PAGA cause of action to the complaint.8
PAGA “authorizes an employee to bring an action for civil penalties on behalf of the
state against his or her employer for Labor Code violations committed against the
employee and fellow employees, with most of the proceeds of that litigation going to the
state.”9 On April 23, 2012, Luxottica filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the
arbitration agreement.10 The agreement provided:
You and the Company each agree that no matter in what capacity,
neither you nor the Company will (1) file (or join, participate or
intervene in) against the other party any lawsuit or court case that
relates in any way to your employment with the Company or (2)
file (or join, participate or intervene in) a class-based lawsuit, court
case or arbitration (including any collective or representative)
arbitration claim).11
Sakkab argued that the PAGA claims could not be arbitrated because he should not be
denied a forum for the representative PAGA claims, and the arbitration agreement
prohibited him from bringing class actions.12 On the other hand, Luxxotica argued that
the FAA preempts California law, specifically the FAA preempts the Iskanian rule;13
therefore, the representative PAGA claim would be barred pursuant to the arbitration
agreement.14 The district court granted the motion to compel arbitration on all counts.15
The district court relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, to find that the FAA would preempt the PAGA claims.
III.  

COURT’S ANALYSIS

The Ninth Circuit started the analysis by setting forth the laws at issue in the
case. The laws included the Private Attorneys General Act, Iskanian v. CLS
Transportation Los Angeles, LLS, and the FAA.17
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The Ninth Circuit set forth that the PAGA was enacted to correct two perceived
flaws in the California Labor Code.18 The first flaw, the Ninth Circuit stated, was that no
civil fines were available to citizens for certain Labor Code violations.19 The only redress
for a violation had been criminal sanctions, available to be prosecuted by the district
attorneys. Therefore, many victims of violations were left uncompensated.20 Hence,
PAGA was enacted to provide another redress for Labor Code violations.21 As a result of
bringing a PAGA action, California imposed civil penalty damages, the proceeds of
which would be divided between the private individual, and the rest to the California
government.22
Further, PAGA provides another monetary redress, if a suit for a violation would
not otherwise provide for compensation.23 Specifically, “PAGA provides that the
penalties are generally $100 for each aggrieved employee per pay period for the initial
violation and $200 per pay period for each subsequent violation.”24 Therefore, the
PAGA class action may heighten the penalty to make the suit economically worthwhile.
The second flaw that PAGA redressed was the shortage of government
resources.25 Even though PAGA afforded the government civil penalties, “there was a
shortage of government resources to pursue enforcement.”26 As set forth by the
legislature of California, the loss to the state’s government from unprosecuted violations
amounted to a tax loss of “three to six billion dollars annually.”27 Further, the negative
effect that PAGA was aimed to redress included “33,000 serious and ongoing wage
violations,” by the garment industry, but the state was only able to indict 100 per year for
all industries.28
Next, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the California Supreme Court’s holding in
Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, which found that PAGA waivers are
prohibited in agreements because such a waiver would be in violation of two provisions
of the California Civil Code.29 First, the Iskanian court found that a PAGA waiver would
be in violation of California Civil Code § 1668, which states that agreements that would
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exculpate a party from a violation of law are unenforceable.30 The California Supreme
Court reasoned that allowing PAGA to be waivable would be negating one of the primary
mechanisms for Labor Code enforcement.31 Further, the California Supreme Court
reasoned that since an agreement which waives PAGA suits would avoid law
enforcement, such an agreement would be “against public policy” and “may not be
enforced.”32 The second provision that a PAGA waiver would violate is Civil Code §
3513, which sets forth that a law established for a public reason may not be contravened
by private agreement.33 Such a waiver would harm the state’s public interest in
“enforcing the Labor Code” and receiving “proceeds of civil penalties used to deter
violations.”34 Lastly, the Iskanian Court held that although that case concerned an
individual agreement, agreements to waive representative PAGA claims would be
unenforceable, as well.35
A.  The Iskanian Rule is a Generally Applicable Rule.
Next, the Ninth Circuit set forth the controlling law in the Federal Arbitration Act.
Typically, the FAA preempts state law “to the extent that it ‘stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’” Further,
the only way to invalidate an arbitration clause under FAA § 2, is by a showing of
“generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.”36 In
order to be a “generally applicable” rule, the rule must not “single out arbitration
agreements”37 and must put arbitration agreements on “equal footing.”38 Further, if a state
rule is “generally applicable” to contract law, the rule is preempted if it conflicts with the
FAA.39
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit briefly mentioned the Court’s holding in AT&T Mobility,
LLC v. Concepcion.40 There, the United States Supreme Court held that the “FAA
preempted [a] California law providing that class action waivers in certain consumer
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contracts of adhesion were unconscionable and unenforceable.”41 The Court found that
the law was preempted by the FAA, though the law was “generally applicable” to all
contracts, because it “conflicted with the purposes of the FAA.”42
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the issue rests on whether the Iskanian rule is
“generally applicable” and whether it conflicted with purposes of the FAA.43 Because the
Iskanian rule prevents any waiver of PAGA claims, and not just a waiver that occurs as a
result of an arbitration clause, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the rule is “generally
applicable.”44
B.  The Iskanian Rule Does Not Conflict with the Principles of the FAA.
Due to the holding in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, the Ninth Circuit looked to
whether the principles of the FAA conflict with the Iskanian Rule.45 As stated by the
Ninth Circuit, the principle reason the FAA was enacted was to defeat the judicial
hostility toward arbitration.46 Thus, state laws prohibiting arbitration in specific types of
claims are preempted.47 As the Iskanian rule only finds that agreements to waive
representative PAGA claims are unenforceable, and does not express any preference
regarding whether individual PAGA claims are litigated or arbitrated, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the Iskanian rule does not prohibit the arbitration of any type of claim.48
Another purpose of the FAA is to “enforce the terms of arbitration agreements.”49
According to the Ninth Circuit, applying the FAA to all terms, no matter whether the
terms are within the FAA § 2 savings clause, would negate any meaning held by the
clause.50 The savings clause states that an agreement to submit to arbitration “shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract.”51 The Ninth Circuit concluded that Congress could
not have intended to strip the savings clause of all meaning.52 Rather, Congress intended
41
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that the FAA preempt only generally applicable contract defenses that interfere with
arbitration.53
The Ninth Circuit looked to AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion to find which
generally applicable contract defenses may interfere with arbitration.54 In AT&T Mobility,
the state law was found to be unenforceable because the law interfered with the
contractually desired arbitral procedures.55 Specifically, the law in AT&T Mobility
“provided that class action waivers in certain consumer contracts of adhesion were
unconscionable.”56 However, according to the United States Supreme Court, such a rule
would impose “classwide arbitration procedures on the parties against their will”57 and in
essence restrict the parties’ freedom of contract. Further, the Ninth Circuit recognized
that the Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility observed that “the switch from bilateral class
arbitration sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration—its informality—and makes
the process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedures of class
arbitration because the procedures were required to protect the due process rights of
absent parties.”58
The Ninth Circuit, however, distinguished PAGA claims from class action suits.59
While class action suits are procedural devices for resolving the claims of absent parties,
PAGA actions are the equivalent of a federal qui tam suit.60 Here, a qui tam suit is a
mechanism which encourages employees to file suits regarding labor code violations on
the government’s behalf.61 PAGA suits, unlike class actions, are penalties an “employeeplaintiff may recover on behalf of the state.”62Also unlike class actions, PAGA
arbitrations “do not require the formal procedures of class arbitrations.”63 Further, no due
process protections for the “absent employee” are present, as the PAGA claimant is
merely a “proxy” of the state.64
53
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The majority opinion found the dissent incorrect in concluding that AT&T
Mobility requires a court to enforce all waivers of representative claims.65 The essential
issue was not whether a rule interfered with the parties’ freedom to limit arbitration, as
the dissent claimed. Rather, the majority stated that the essential issue is whether the
procedures which the statute or rule prohibits interfere with arbitration.66 The Ninth
Circuit concluded against finding that the rule interfered with arbitration, as the
individual employee brings suit on behalf of the government and not all other
individuals.67
The Ninth Circuit also found that the mere fact that the civil penalties would be
greater does not mean that the FAA would preempt the Iskanian rule.68 Neither would the
FAA preempt PAGA claims if the arbitration agreement specifically stated that PAGA
claims were waived.69 Additionally, the FAA does not require courts to enforce
agreements which waive representative PAGA actions because the penalties an aggrieved
employee would recover under formal procedures of litigation are more attractive than
arbitration’s informal procedures.70
The Ninth Circuit suggested that the representative PAGA claims would not make
arbitration more “costly” and “slower.’71 The Ninth Circuit analogized PAGA claims
with other claims that are more complex, such as antitrust claims, that would make
arbitration more costly.72 However, such complexity does not mean that “a rule declining
to enforce waivers of such claims interferes with the FAA in any meaningful sense, since,
unlike class claims, parties are free to arbitrate them using the procedures of their
choice.”73 Any “procedural morass” is thus the parties’ choice.74 In conclusion, the Ninth
Circuit found that the agreement did not set forth whether the parties would choose to
arbitrate or litigate PAGA claims. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit remanded the issue to the
district court.75
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IV.  

SIGNIFICANCE

This case is significant because the Ninth Circuit allowed an alternative to an
absolute waiver of a representative suit, despite an arbitral agreement containing a class
action waiver. In practice, PAGA claims have many similarities to class actions, as the
Ninth Circuit set forth.76 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a party cannot
waive a PAGA claim via an arbitration clause.
Courts have already used the holding in Sakkab to enforce a PAGA claim. For
example, in Zackaria v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California held that despite the court’s order of a waiver of class action claims
in the contract, the Plaintiff is not thereafter barred from instituting a PAGA suit.77 In
coming to such a conclusion, the court relied in part on Sakkab, specifically the holding
that PAGA claims are akin to qui tam actions, rather than class action suits.78 Other
courts have had to decide on similar issues.79
Whether other courts will similarly hold that parties cannot waive representative
qui tam claims via a waiver of class arbitration should be an interesting development in
arbitration, the consequences of which may have significant legislative impact. For
example, state legislatures may be able to enact statutes that enable qui tam claims for
other violations that the state does not have enough resources to litigate. The State could
theoretically enact qui tam claims for state tax violations, environmental law violations,
or labor code violations, for example. The plaintiff thus may have the ability to sue where
he or she would not have otherwise, due to the cost of arbitration.80
Further, the Sakkab holding is significant because of the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion and class actions. The Ninth Circuit held
that AT&T Mobility merely set forth that a “law providing that class action waivers in
certain consumer contracts of adhesion were unconscionable and unenforceable, was
preempted by the FAA.”81 Further, the Ninth Circuit found that AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion held that class arbitration was unenforceable if parties waived class action
arbitration in the contract, as to enforce otherwise would be in violation of the freedom to
76
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select informal procedures.82
These holdings effectively limit AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion, as the case could have been more expansively interpreted to bar any law
which limits a parties choice of process, including the limits that PAGA may place on the
streamlined arbitral hearing.83 AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, could additionally be
interpreted so as to bar any claims that would limit the party’s freedom of contract to
choose who can be a part of the arbitral agreement.84 PAGA claims, contrary to the Ninth
Circuit’s reading of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, could limit a party’s freedom of
contract because the PAGA claim mandates the participation of the state, a party which
was not in the original arbitral agreement.
V.  

CRITIQUE

Whether the Supreme Court would have reached the same conclusion as the Ninth
Circuit is questionable. The Sakkab decision seems to be a break away from freedom of
contract in that the Ninth Circuit does not enforce the arbitration agreement according to
the terms of the contract.
First, the Ninth Circuit held that the parties have a choice to arbitrate or litigate
representative PAGA claims but the parties cannot waive them altogether by
incorporating a class action waiver. Further, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the
representative PAGA claims could not be waived by a class action waiver because the
party is bringing the suit on behalf of the state. However, the state was never a part of the
agreement. Therefore, freedom of contract is abridged because the state is stepping in to
control a private contract. Similarly, the court recognized that the parties likely did not
expect the enforcement of PAGA claims pursuant to their agreement.85 Nevertheless, the
Ninth Circuit found that PAGA claims cannot be waived and therefore that the claims can
either be litigated or arbitrated.
Effectively, the Ninth Circuit has gone awry of freedom of contract in three
respects: (1) although the court admitted that the parties likely intended the PAGA claim
to be within the class action waiver, it found that the PAGA still can be brought; (2) the
court enforced the PAGA claims on the behalf of the state, even though the state is not a
party to the contract; and (3) the court allowed the alternative of litigation despite the
parties’ agreement to arbitrate all disputes arising from the employment. In contrast, the
Supreme Court consistently protects the parties’ freedom of contract and strives to
enforce the intent of the parties with regard to the arbitral clause, even if doing so would
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deter a claim from being arbitrated.86 Likewise, the Supreme Court has never made the
alternative of litigation available to arbitration waivers that essentially impede the
bringing of a suit.87
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit broke from the reasoning of the Supreme Court in two
other respects. Part of the majority’s reasoning was the importance of PAGA claims to
the state of California in prosecuting violations of the Labor Code.88 However, other
claims in the past, have been deterred due to the class action waiver, despite the
importance of the statute.89 Another reason the court found that representative PAGA
claims cannot be waived is that the claims do not have an effect on the parties’ ability to
choose the arbitral procedures. However, the same can be said about class action. In class
action waivers, the parties are still able to choose the extent of discovery, the number of
arbitrators, whether arbitrators are to write a statement of reasons, et cetera; however,
according to the Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility, class actions can be waived.
VI.  

CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit, in Sakkab v. Luxottica, has interpreted AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion, narrowly, thereby allowing the arbitration of PAGA claims despite a class
action waiver. Further, the Ninth Circuit, while finding an equitable outcome for the
litigation of PAGA claims by allowing the parties to choose whether to arbitrate or
litigate the claims, strays from the doctrine of freedom of contract which has been relied
upon by the Supreme Court’s decisions on arbitration. Lastly, the Sakkab holding has the
possibility of being applied in other legislative settings.
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